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Farm-Level Response  to Agricultural Effluent
Control Strategies: The Case of the Willamette Valley
Michael L. Taylor, Richard M. Adams, and Stanley F. Miller
This article  examines  economic  incentives and  other mechanisms  to  offset non-point
source  pollution  from agriculture.  A  biophysical  simulator to  estimate  technical  rela-
tionships is linked to linear programming  models  for representative  farms in the Wil-
lamette Valley of Oregon.  The models are then optimized for profit maximization under
alternative  non-point pollution  control  policies.  The results  indicate  that site-specific
resource conditions and production possibilities greatly influence policy effectiveness and
the cost of achieving pollution abatement. Nevertheless, some abatement is possible  on
all farms for relatively little cost.
Key  words:  BMPs,  bioeconomic  modeling,  nitrogen  effluent  control,  on-farm  costs,
water pollution.
Rapid changes in the structure of U.S. agriculture  since World War II, particularly agriculture's  reliance
on  agricultural  chemicals,  have  produced  environmental  effects  causing growing  public  concern  (U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency; Vigon). In addition, public awareness of  and demand for environmental
amenities are changing attitudes towards the agricultural industry  and its implicit property rights (Batie).
This change  in attitudes  is evidenced  by the growing  use of regulatory  controls  for pollution problems,
and the coupling of federal  agricultural support programs with land use and other restrictions  on farm-
level decisions.
As the societal debate on agricultural pollution moves toward implementation of specific control policies,
it is important to understand how economic incentives and other farm-level mechanisms to offset pollution
are likely to influence farmer behavior. An evaluation of the farm-level consequences of such policies can
provide insight into the effectiveness  of these policies and suggest whether the social goal of a sustainable
food supply that meets environmental demands  in rural areas is attainable.
The  overall  objective of this  article  is to assess  farm-level  responses  to  policies  designed to control
nitrogen,  phosphorus,  and soil sediment  effluent from farmland,  with particular application  to the Wil-
lamette Valley of Oregon.  Specifically,  we examine the economic  efficiency of selected  pollution control
policies  in a diverse agricultural  setting.  The  approach integrates a biophysical  simulation  model with
farm-level economic models to capture both technical and economic dimensions of agricultural effluents.
The  Willamette  Valley  offers  an excellent  case  study for  such  research,  given  the highly  diversified
nature of agricultural production in the region and a range of soils and topographic conditions. The findings
from this case study simulate the farm-level effects of agricultural effluent control policies under complex
conditions; the results suggest the feasibility  of control instruments in meeting effluent goals under such
diversity.
Physical and Economic Dimensions  of Agricultural Externalities
A primary concern about agricultural production methods is their effect on water quality and subsequent
impacts on human and animal health, wildlife, water treatment costs, and recreational activities. Excessive
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nitrates (NO3-) in drinking water have been linked to methemoglobinemia disease (blue baby) in animals
and infants (Bower). At high levels, nitrogen in water can be toxic to humans and animals, and nitrogen
in ammonia can kill  or injure  fish (Miranowski;  Crosson and Brubaker).  Nitrogen and  phosphorus  also
play a  role in  accelerating  eutrophication 1through the  stimulation of aquatic  plant growth,  which  can
restrict navigation,  reduce  recreational  values,  produce  undesirable  tastes  and odors in  water  supplies,
and deplete dissolved oxygen. Pesticides reach surface water and groundwater in smaller proportions than
nitrates, but their widespread use, persistence,  and toxicity at low concentrations  are of concern (National
Research Council).
These potential environmental damages arise from four processes: (a) soil erosion resulting in sediment
deposition  off the  field  of origin;  (b) fertilizer  and  pesticide  runoff deposited  directly  in surface water
courses;  (c) fertilizer, nutrients, and pesticides percolating into groundwater;  and (d) volatilization  losses
at the time  of application.  Referred  to as non-point  sources  (NPS),  these  processes  result  in the  most
common form of agricultural pollution. The significance of NPS pollution from a management perspective
is  that  regulation,  control,  and  containment  are  more  difficult  to  implement  than  with  point-source
pollution.  A  lack  of data  on  the  extent of pollution in  rural  areas  and  on the  relationships  between
agricultural production methods and pollution levels hinders development of control strategies.  However,
increased research  efforts,  particularly with respect to nitrogen and phosphorus,  are narrowing the infor-
mation  gap.
Research indicates that crops use only 50 to 70% of applied  nitrogen fertilizer (Johnson; Keeny),  with
the remainder either transported  by erosion  or runoff, leached,  or chemically transformed and lost to the
atmosphere.  Plant nutrient  use in the U.S. nearly tripled from 1960 to  1981,  with a substantial  increase
in total and per acre  nitrogen  fertilizer application.  The amount of nutrients delivered  to surface water
and groundwater likely increased  as well (Miranowski).
Off-site effects associated with soil erosion, and some rough damage estimates, are provided by Ribaudo,
and Clark, Haverkamp,  and Chapman.  Despite  a federal investment of $15 billion and "many billions
of  dollars" more by farmers, contemporary soil erosion rates are almost as severe as 50 years ago (Colacicco,
Osborn, and Alt), due in part to agricultural production practices such as larger acreages of monocultures.
Agriculturalists,  not accustomed  to being perceived as a polluting industry,  tend to see  water quality
as mostly an information problem (Batie). Many non-agriculturalists, however, see public policy and direct
controls, or a redefinition of property rights, as the solution. This has been manifested in the promulgation
of various  regulations:  Arizona  requires  permits for all  fertilizer applications;  fertilizer  use  regulations
have been imposed in Mississippi and Nebraska; and fertilizer taxes are now in effect in Iowa, Wisconsin,
and Illinois (Ferguson, Klausner, and Reid).
The problem  facing  policy makers  is to identify  control  strategies  that  do not significantly  harm  the
industry.  What  constitutes a Best Management  Practice  (BMP) may depend  upon local circumstances,
but particular  tillage and  management  systems usually  fit the criteria for such practices.  These include
reduced and no-tillage, low input or sustainable agriculture systems, and nitrogen management techniques.
Some believe  that the broad definition of BMPs prevents  a clear  and definitive analysis for policy  (e.g.,
L. Christensen;  Crutchfield,  Ervin,  and  Brazee);  a practice  may  be "best"  in an  engineering  sense  for
minimizing loss of  chemicals, but not in an economic sense. Traditional approaches to economic evaluation
and selection of BMPs have relied on partial-budgeting approaches that compare costs of operation  only,
rather than incorporating perceived yield impacts (L. Christensen).
The environmental  economics literature  (e.g.,  Baumol and  Oates; Shortle and Dunn)  suggests at least
six general approaches for correcting such externalities.  These include:  charges (or Pigouvian taxes), which
involve  a direct tax on  the effluent  causing the externality;  input taxes  (such  as for nitrogen  fertilizer);
standards, defined as levels representing an "acceptable  environment"; controls, which involve a directive
to decision makers about specific practices which must be used (such as no-tillage) or which are banned
from use (such as certain pesticides);  cost-share incentives,  in which public agencies bear a portion of the
use of pollution control measures; and transferable pollution permits, which may or may not be exchanged
for bid prices.
In general,  these  various regulations  are targeted to  affect management  (e.g.,  choice of crop rotations
and mix, sources and application levels of nutrients, and pest control)  and tillage practices (such as deep
plow, minimum tillage, or no-till), particularly by incorporation  of BMPs. However, the linkage between
the theory  and application  of measures  for control  is complicated  by  the nature of the pollutants.  An
inherent  feature  of non-point  sources  of pollution  is that  flows  cannot  be monitored  with  reasonable
accuracy  or at reasonable  cost.  Another is that  non-point  pollution is  stochastic  in nature,  influenced
strongly by weather  processes. As a result, policy analysts increasingly rely on biophysical models which
estimate or predict environmental flows and simulate agronomic processes. While such biophysical models
will  never  be perfect  substitutes  for monitoring  of actual  flows, they  can serve  as important tools for
analysis  (Shortle and Dunn).
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Related Literature
Policy and economic issues associated with agricultural non-point  pollution are  well documented.  Park
and Shabman  examined  local  versus regional  distributional  constraints on quality  improvements,  and
developed a benefits and compensation scheme  for implementation.  Sharp  and Bromley focused  on the
coordination  of institutions  in implementing  NPS  control,  finding  that  flexibility and  adaptability  by
agencies  is necessary to  reconcile conflicting incentives. Griffin and Bromley  evaluated  versions of four
strategies for control where (a) returns to farmers are known by planners and (b) runoffis observed without
error. They concluded the approaches  are  equally efficient  when specified  properly. Saliba addressed the
physical and economic  relationships  of irrigation  and groundwater  quality, and  recommended  policies
for irrigation  management  to influence  non-point  effects. Shortle and Dunn identified and assessed  the
efficiency of four environmental  control policies for NPS pollution, finding that properly  specified man-
agement practice incentives generally outperform runoff standards, runoff incentives, and direct controls.
Shortle and Miranowski demonstrated that improved  efficiency in allocation of resources may be elusive
because allocative  efficiency  is not necessarily  unidirectional;  that  is,  intervention  may be counterpro-
ductive to pollution control.
Regulations focus primarily on the use of BMPs as a means of control. Segerson addressed the issue of
the appropriateness  and flexibility of BMPs as a pollution control measure, finding  they do not always
provide cost-minimizing  abatement  strategies. Stevens  evaluated  the fiscal  impacts of imposed charges
and input taxes on nitrogen and water, with input taxes determined to be more expensive than an effluent
fee. Griffin used an optimal control model to assess the spatial and intertemporal effects of pollution on
economic efficiency, finding that pollutant persistence  alone invalidates the economic advantage of price-
guided policies over regulatory policies. Lambert  addressed the use of input taxes as a control policy for
nitrogen leachate  and its impact on distribution of farm net returns according to risk attitudes.
Empirical research on non-point pollution relies heavily on technical information generated by natural
and  physical  scientists, information  that  is  frequently  difficult  to  obtain  on a  site-specific  basis.  Not
surprisingly, then, the integration of models of biophysical systems with economic assessment techniques
has been considered for at least the last decade. Jacobs and Timmons, Heimlich and Ogg, L. Christensen,
Duttweiler and Nicholson, Setia and Magleby, and Crutchfield, Ervin, and Brazee are notable examples
of research that features this bioeconomic integration.
Approach  and Procedures
The approach used here to evaluate farm-level policies for the control of non-point source pollution from
nutrients  proceeds  in a  general  two-part  simulation  involving (a) a biophysical  simulator  to generate
environmental and technical parameters, which are then linked with (b) an economic optimization model
of farm-level  behavior  (Taylor).  Specifically,  this  simulation  process  consists  of a  series  of steps:  (a)
identifying  characteristic  soils, land slopes, and crops in the region;  (b) building activities  of particular
input levels (fertilizer applications, tillage  practices,  and machinery),  which represent the options faced
by  farmers,  for use  in both  the biophysical  simulator  and optimization  model;  (c)  running computer
simulations of these combinations  for a sufficient length of time  (25  years) to produce expected  annual
levels of crop and environmental outputs; (d) creating representative farms containing  appropriate soils
and crop rotation options for the associated biophysical simulator outputs; (e) selecting profit-maximizing
crop rotations for each  farm; and (f)  optimizing the (linear programming) models  under constraints of
imposed standards, charges, and taxes.
The Erosion-Productivity  Impact Calculator (EPIC) biophysical simulator, developed by the Agricul-
tural Research  Service (Williams et al.)  generates the technical and environmental information required
for this economic analysis. It is designed to simulate crop growth and nutrient flow under varying conditions
with respect to climate and soil ("environmental inputs"), and farming system characteristics.  The phys-
ically-based  components  of EPIC  include  hydrology,  weather simulation,  erosion  simulation,  nutrient
cycling, plant growth, tillage, and soil temperature. EPIC's yield response model is based on the principle
of "yield  plateaus,"  an  assumption frequently used by  soil  scientists.  The use  of yield  plateaus also  is
found in economic research of fertilization  (e.g.,  Lanzer,  Paris, and Williams). The plateau  implies that
overapplication  of inputs (nutrients or water) does not translate into negative marginal products. Among
outputs generated by EPIC are annual crop yields (averaged over the simulation period) and nutrient flow
levels.
EPIC has been applied to a number of biophysical-economic linkage  models. Recent examples include
an evaluation  of conservation compliance on Tennessee  farms (Thompson et al.)  and cropping strategy
assessment in the Texas Trans-Pecos  region (Ellis et al.).
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A difficulty inherent in most off-the-shelfbiophysical simulation models is that coefficients and processes
must be calibrated to reflect local conditions. Such calibration is essential to model validation, as it ensures
that results are applicable  to the region of interest. Proper calibration of biophysical simulation models,
such as EPIC, is complicated by a lack of data on nitrate leaching or runoff and soil erosion under regional
conditions,  a  problem  encountered  in  this  study.  EPIC  parameters  regarding  nitrogen  fate  were  not
calibrated explicitly in this study; however, the results are consistent with ongoing physical science research
in the Willamette Valley.  Nevertheless,  errors in estimation  may exist.
EPIC results for the Willamette Valley were treated in the following manner. Simulation runs of typical
operations  (as determined  by interviews  with farmers)  were  made  for wheat,  corn,  and grass  seed  for
seven soils; yields and environmental outputs (erosion and nitrogen and nitrate flows) were then estimated.
Soil scientists assessed the model's performance based on their knowledge  of nutrient fate in the region.
For most soils, the performance of the nutrient model was consistent with limited empirical information,
but crop yield estimates were  10 to 25% low. In the case of one important soil type, simulated yields were
too low and  leachate  higher than  expected;  results were  noted  as  probable  "overestimates"  of actual
leachate. For a second, less important soil, estimated erosion was deemed excessive  by the soil scientists,
and the soil was eliminated from the analysis.
Estimated yields from the 25-year simulations were indexed to crop yields that would be expected from
each soil,  and served as base yields.  Then, yields generated under  alternative scenarios (changed tillage,
fertilizer levels, or rotations) were computed relative to the base yields. While such an indexing of estimated
yields may impose a source of error, the primary  intent in using the biophysical  simulator is to estimate
changes in environmental  outputs under alternative  control strategies, not absolute  levels.
A separate  linear program for each of the representative  farms is modeled with the General Algebraic
Modeling  System (GAMS) (Brooke,  Kendrick,  and Meeraus)  using input from the EPIC simulator.  Spe-
cifically,  environmental outputs  (nutrient flow levels and erosion) and crop yields from EPIC are incor-
porated  as  technical  coefficients.  Farm-level data  are used to  generate  crop  budgets,  and farm-specific
behavior (relating  to rotations and tillage  practice combinations)  is used in  forming both activities and
constraints. Environmental restrictions and regulations  are then imposed on the farm-level models to test
the efficacy  of various regulatory policies.
The output of the representative  farm  models is an optimal  (profit-maximizing)  crop mix (including
rotation and tillage practices) and an associated set of environmental outflows under alternative pollution
control strategies. The changes in profit, crop mix, and physical outputs between the unrestricted (unreg-
ulated) farm in the base case and that farm under imposed policies provide a measure of  policy effectiveness
and farm-level cost (reduced profit).
Conceptually,  the LP model is identical for all representative farms.  A maximum  profit plan is given
by solving a problem with the following components.
Maximize
(1)  PRICEi  Yi  -EXPENDsXs  -TAX  Qf
subject to:
(2)  -Y  + YIELDikZ  = 0  for all i
(3)  ACRESrkZk  < Sr  for all r
(4)  ENTjkZk  -Lj  =  0  for all j
(5)  ENVOUTfZk  -Qf  =  0  for allf
(6)  INPsjLj  -X  =  0  for all s
(7)  MACHU.Lj  < Tut  for u, t
Yi,  Zk, Li, X,  Qf 2 0
The activities are  Yi,  the quantity produced of crop  i; Xs, units of input s; Zk, acres of rotation set k; Lj,
acres  of enterprise activity j; and  Qy, units of environmental  output f  The coefficients include PRICEi,
price of crop i; EXPENDs, per unit cost of input s; YIELDik, yield of crop i in rotation k; ACRESrk, acres
of soil r  in rotation k; ENTjk, acres of enterprise activityj in rotation k; ENVOUT,,  units of environmental
outputf in rotation k; INPs,  units of input s for enterprise  activity j; and MACHUj, hours of machine u
at time t of the crop year for enterprise j.  Resource limits are Sr, acre limit of soil  r; and Tt, hour limit
for machine u at time  t of the crop year.
The objective  function  [equation  (1)]  is maximized,  generating  total revenue  minus  expenditure  for
inputs. The first constraint  [equation  (2)]  links products (crops sold)  with yields associated with various
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rotation  and management  combinations.  The second  constraint  [equation  (3)]  is an acreage  limitation,
based on soil types for respective farms. Equation  (4) links enterprise activities to rotations. The fourth
constraint  [equation  (5)]  accounts  for environmental  outputs,  such  as nitrate percolation  and erosion,
generated  by  crop rotations,  measured  as the total  for the farm.  Equation  (6)  compiles input costs  of
enterprise activities. The final constraint limits machinery usage by enterprise to hours available in various
time periods.  (An option for machinery rental was considered,  but was never binding.)
The linkage between activities and crop rotation sets is a key component of this formulation. Activities
are  defined  as the particular  input levels,  costs, and  operations  associated  with production  of a single
commodity.  For example, an activity  might be winter wheat, produced using conservation  tillage,  with
140  pounds  of applied nitrogen.  A  number of activities  are  defined  for  each  enterprise  to provide  a
reasonable  variety  of points on  the production  function.  Rotations  (such as wheat following  corn  and
wheat following grass seed)  combine appropriate enterprise  activities with  soils and land slope,  thereby
reflecting  the biophysical interactions  associated  with  crop  rotations in  the  simulated  crop  yields and
environmental  outflows.
Study Area
The empirical  focus of this  study is on  the Willamette  Valley of Oregon, an important diversified agri-
cultural region in the Pacific Northwest.  Commodities produced include grass grown for seed,  hay, small
grains, vegetables for processing, berries, and horticultural products. The climate consists of  mild summers
and  cool winters  with heavy precipitation.  Winter  precipitation is an  important climatic  characteristic
due to the high proportion  of fall seeded crops.
Studies of  agricultural externalities in the Willamette Valley indicate "frequent contamination" of surface
water and groundwater (Oregon Department of Environmental Quality). Nationally, the Willamette River
Basin ranks in the highest category of phosphorus, inorganic nitrogen, and total nitrogen levels (Omernik).
Soil erosion is not considered a general  problem, despite the high annual rainfall (N. Christensen). A few
cultivated foothill areas, however,  are subject to moderate to severe erosion. The Willamette  Valley also
contains nearly  80% of the state's population,  increasing  the potential damage from agricultural  exter-
nalities.
Because  the region has no dominant  crop or  farm type,  five farm types  are  defined to  represent the
major combinations  of crops, soil types, and geographic subregions within the valley.  These include two
farms representing river bottomland,  two for the broad terrace lands, and one for the foothills (table  1).
An important characteristic of these farms is the wide  range of crop,  soil, and cultural practice  options
available to farmers; this characteristic is likely to affect the efficiency of imposed regulations.
Five policy options are tested. These include: (a)  a per unit tax on leached nitrates and runoff of organic
nitrogen and nitrates, as well as combinations of each, implemented by including in the objective function
a positive tax (TAXjQf)  on relevant environmental outflows; (b) a tax on nitrogen fertilizer, implemented
as a tax equal to  50% and  100% of the cost of nitrogen;  (c) per acre  effluent standards of various levels,
imposed by placing a maximum limit constraint on per acre runoff (or leachate)  as  Qf  < LIMITf,  (d) a
requirement for use of no-till drills on small grains and grass seed production; and (e) a ban of fall fertilizer
applications to reduce winter leachate.
Results of Pollution  Control Options
Results of the simulation framework are presented  in two parts.  The first provides a summary of results
(including environmental outputs) for the base case or current situation (unrestricted scenario) as computed
by each of the representative farm models. The second set of results is generated by imposing the various
pollution control mechanisms  on the biophysical simulation-LP models.
Base Case Analysis
Results of the representative farm  models for the unrestricted case are presented  in this section, and in
table  2. The solutions generated represent the most profitable  crop mixes given the resources,  soils, and
production constraints  facing each farm. The magnitude  of effluent (soil erosion, leachate, and runoff) is
not considered in the choice of crop mixes, and remains unvalued.
Bottomland  and  terrace  farms  with well-drained  soils are  profitable  under intensive  crop  rotations,
including vegetables,  grass seed, and small grains, with winter cover crops. Simulated nitrate leaching in
the bottomland farms averages  more than  16 pounds per acre  over the crop mix. Runoff of nitrates and
nitrogen and  soil erosion,  however,  are  low relative to the farms with poorly-drained soils.  Compared
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Acreage  450 acres,  1% slope
Main Crop  Vegetables
Location  Central valley
Soil  Sandy loam
(2)  Poorly-drained bottomland
Acreage  200 acres,  1% slope
Main Crop  Grass seed and pasture/hay
Location  North valley
Soil  Clay
(3)  Well-drained terrace  land
Acreage  500  acres, with 373  acres  1% slope,  80 acres  6% slope,
32 acres  10% slope, and  15  acres  15%  slope
Main Crop  Wheat, vegetables
Location  Central valley
Soil  Loam
(4)  Poorly-drained terrace  land
Acreage  1,000 acres,  1% slope
Main Crop  Grass seed
Location  Southern valley
Soil  Clay
(5) Well-drained  foothills
Acreage  400 acres,  with 193 acres 5% slope,  128 acres  10%
slope, and 79 acres  15%  slope
Main Crop  Pasture
Location  All valley foothill areas
Soil  Sandy loam
Table 2.  Results of Unrestricted Solution for Each Representative Farm
Valley Location
Bottom  Bottom  Terrace  Terrace  Foothills
Range of Slope  1%  1%  1-15%  1%  5-15%
Farm Acreage  450  200  500  1,000  400
Drainage Condition  Excellent  Poor  Good  Poor  Excellent
Crop Rotation:
Corn/beans  167  26
Corn/beans (85%  fertilizer applied)  201
Corn/beans/wheat  (w/cover crop)  89
Perennial ryegrass seed  90  40  100  200
Perennial ryegrass seed (no fall N)  80
Tall fescue seed  54  24  60  34
Annual ryegrass seed (no-till)  136  740
Wheat/annual  ryegrass seed (no-till)  139  180
Wheat (no-till)  50
Christmas trees  140
Effluent Per Acre:
Soil erosion (tons)  0.30  0.07  1.85  0.14  1.10
Organic  N lost to sediment (lbs.)  0.75  0.53  3.77  0.72  5.65
NO3 lost to runoff(lbs.)  1.86  10.27  5.15  12.23  3.81
NO3 leached  beyond root zone (lbs.)  16.64  2.92  4.47  3.31  26.79
Phosphorus  lost to runoff (lbs.)  0.61  0.89  0.83  0.91  0.00
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Figure 1.  Nitrogen and nitrate effluent  from Willamette Valley  farms
with  other farms,  effluent  from the terrace  farm  consists of a moderate  level of nitrate leaching  (4.47
pounds per acre), reasonably  high runoff of organic-N and nitrates (8.92 pounds per acre), and nearly two
tons per acre of soil erosion. An essential difference between the farms is that the terrace farm encompasses
four slope classes  and increased runoff and erosion with steepness.
A different outcome applies to the poorly-drained farms of the bottomland and terraces because fewer
cropping  options exist. The profit-maximizing  solutions for the representative  farms are  dominated by
annual and perennial grass seeds. As a consequence, simulated leaching of nitrates is less than 3.5 pounds
per acre, but losses exceed  10 pounds per acre.
The fifth representative farm (for the foothills) features highly profitable land uses, primarily Christmas
trees and wheat-annual  ryegrass.  Perennial  ryegrass for seed  occupies the remaining acreage.  As a con-
sequence of the well-drained nature of the soils, considerably higher leaching of nitrates occurs and runoff
is also greater than for the other farms, but erosion rates are generally low.
In summary, the base case of  unrestricted farm production suggests one farm with potential groundwater
problems,  two  with potential runoff problems,  and two having a mix  of both. It is  significant that the
various  forms  of non-point  pollution are  not isolated  geographically,  in that both leaching  and runoff
occur on bottom, terrace,  and foothill farms.  Excessive erosion (above a sustaining level) occurs on two
farms; phosphorus runoff was minor in nearly all rotations. Figure 1 summarizes the relative severity of
nitrogen-based  effluent from the five farms.
Least-Cost Solutions
In evaluating  specific  control options for the various  farms and pollutants, it is instructive  to measure
those  options  against  some  benchmark.  Pollution control  options  are  gauged here  according to  their
effectiveness  in achieving  abatement at "least cost." The first step in providing such a comparison is to
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Figure 2.  Cost  of nitrate leaching  abatement, well-drained  bottomland farm
abatement levels. These frontiers of least-cost solutions are obtained by constraining each farm to effluent
levels of a specified  average  per acre  level.  The efficiency frontiers  of two farms are  shown in figures  2
and  3,  which display changes  in  profit associated with  percentage  of abatement.  The LP results  which
determine  an  efficiency  frontier  and  applied  control  measures  for  the bottomland  farm  (figure  2)  are
displayed in table  3.
The targeted  pollutant  varies  by  farm.  The well-drained  bottomland  farm  requires  reduced  nitrate
leaching and, as  expected, the least-cost crop mixes change with respect  to abatement level.  In general,
such restrictions  result  in shifts away  from monocropping  to greater  use of intensive  rotations and to
reduced nitrogen  applications.  Leachate  control on the foothill farm causes  shifts  from cultivated crops
to Christmas trees, then to rangeland.
When runoff control is applied to the two  poorly-drained farms, the least-cost  solution  reflects lower
nitrogen inputs  on grass seed,  and eventually  shifts to irrigated hay.  An important difference  between
these farms and those farms  with better  soil  quality is that reduction  in profit  is roughly  double for a
given abatement level. Crop mix and management options are more limited on the poorly-drained farms,
and abatement control more expensive.
The well-drained terrace farm is in many ways the most difficult to target for effluent reduction because
reduction  in one  environmental  residual  (leaching,  runoff,  or erosion)  often increases  another,  unless
multiple instruments are used. At the same time, it presents the widest choice of production options of
any farm. Because of multiple pollution problems, there is no single optimal solution path,2 so the analysis
focuses  on controlling  runoff and  leaching  in tandem  at  increasingly  restrictive  levels.  In  general,  the
optimal  patterns  involve  more  intensive vegetable  rotations  and longer  rotations  of perennial  crops.
Abatement  is more difficult on this farm,  due in part to the multiple effluent problem.  For example, to
achieve a 50% reduction in total effluent entails a $90 per acre decline in profit, whereas the per acre costs
on other farms are $27 to $60.
In  summary,  least-cost  solution  results  for each  farm  indicate  that some  abatement  of pollution is
possible  on all farms for relatively  little cost. This point is demonstrated in table 4. In general,  a slight
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Figure 3.  Cost of organic nitrogen and nitrate runoff abatement, poorly-drained  terrace farm
on the pollutant  and the farm  type.  Even this modest abatement  level is more expensive  for the more
poorly drained land.
Applied Control Measures
Five specific control policy options are tested, including direct charges (taxes) on effluent,  input taxes, per
acre  standards on effluent,  required  use of no-till drills on  small grains and grass for seed, and a ban on
fall fertilizer applications. The solutions for these applied policies are compared with the least-cost solutions
presented  above.
Charges. A tax on  groundwater  leachate  for the well-drained bottomland  and foothill  farms induces
"nitrogen-conserving"  behavior  reflected  in changes  in crop mix.  These changes come  at some cost  to
farmers, both in terms of lower absolute profit associated with the new set of crops, and in the tax charge
on remaining leachate.  But, importantly, the crop mix that results from the charge is consistent with the
least-cost  solutions.  In  fact,  the  difference in profit  that results  between  the charge  and the  least-cost
solution (for a particular abatement level) is just equal to the tax charge for the remaining effluent.  (This
result is consistent with qualitative analysis of such pollution charges.) On poorly-drained soils, however,
charges  on  runoff are  ineffective.  Only at high  charge  levels  is significant  abatement  achieved (with a
corresponding  crop mix change),  and then at high cost. The dichotomy of choices  (profitable grass seed
versus less-profitable  hay/pasture) is evident in the LP response to the charges.  Pigouvian taxes are also
ineffective at reducing  runoff and leaching  on the terrace  farm's well-drained  soils. When  administered
on both leaching and runoff simultaneously,  a high tax charge  is absorbed  because of a lack of available
adjustments on the part of the farmer.
Standards. When  per  acre  standards  are  imposed on the well-drained  bottomland  farm, the  cost to
farmers of such standards is higher than corresponding least-cost solutions, particularly in the mid-range
of abatement (for example, at 40% in fig.  2). The resulting crop mixes are also considerably different from
the least-cost  solutions. In general,  the solutions to  achieve per acre  standards  contain crops which are
nearly uniform in leachate, tending to have levels close to the specified standard for all acres. This contrasts
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Table 3.  Least-Cost Solutions  and Measures  to Induce Change  in Groundwater Percolation of Nitrates
(Well-Drained  Bottomland Farm)
Per Acre Profit  N0 3-Leachate/Acre
Rank and Policy  ($)  %  Change  (lbs.)  % Change
Optimal Solutions:*
Unrestricted  147.33  - 16.6  -
Average NO3 leached  <  15 lbs.  143.57  -2.6  15.0  -9.9
Average NO3 leached  <  12.5 lbs.  135.99  -7.7  12.5  -24.9
Average NO3leached  <  10  lbs.  126.62  -14.1  10.0  -39.9
Average NO3 leached  <  7.5  lbs.  117.21  -20.4  7.5  -54.9
Average  NO3 leached  <  5 lbs.  106.41  -27.8  5.0  -70.0
Average  NO3 leached  <  2.5  lbs.  95.61  -35.1  2.5  -85.0
Average  NO3 leached  <  1 lb.  88.65  -39.8  1.0  -94.0
Charges  on Leachate:
$4 per lb. of NO3 leached  87.23  -40.8  7.6  -54.5
$6 per lb. of NO3leached  82.75  -43.8  0.9  -94.8
$12 per lb. of NO3 leached  77.93  -47.1  0.7  -95.9
Nitrogen Tax:
+50%  tax on N fertilizer  122.05  -17.2  16.4  -1.7
Per Acre Standards:
Leached NO3 <  30 lbs. per acre  140.18  -4.9  16.3  -2.3
Leached NO3 <  20 lbs. per acre  133.56  -9.4  12.8  -23.0
Leached NO3  <  15 lbs. per acre  110.85  -24.8  9.8  -41.1
Leached NO3 <  10 lbs. per acre  90.60  -38.5  1.6  -90.5
Leached NO3 <  6 lbs. per acre  88.48  -39.9  0.8  -94.2
Controls:
Required  use of no-till  drills  144.87  -1.7  20.8  +25.0
Fall fertilizer ban  137.03  -7.0  18.5  +10.8
* Least-cost  solution for average leachate  per acre.
low. The difference in profit is the additional efficiency loss from the standards. At the highest abatement
levels (95%),  the profits and rotation mixes are similar to the least-cost solutions, reflecting  the declining
range of choices  as  increasingly  stringent  controls  are imposed.  A  similar  situation takes place  on the
foothill  farm.  On poorly-drained  soils, per  acre standards  on runoff are  able to induce an intermediate
abatement level  (50%) unattainable  by charges  (fig.  3), but again, the crop mix is considerably  different
than  the comparable  least-cost  solution. An unusual blend of rotations,  some with  only  50% nitrogen
applied  and others having full nitrogen,  is the result. A multiple-target  set of standards (for example, on
runoff and erosion) applied  to the well-drained terrace farm  will provide cost-effective  (that is, at least-
cost) control  in  a limited  range of overall  abatement  levels.  However,  it does not result in least-cost
solutions in most cases.
Table 4.  Cost Per Acre  of Attaining Nitrogen  and Nitrate Abate-
ment for Five  Representative Farms, Willamette  Valley
Abate-  Cost per  Cost per
ment  Acrea  Lb.b
Farm  Target  (%)  ($)  ($)
Well-drained bottomland  Ground  9.9  3.76  2.29
Poorly-drained bottomland  Surface  4.7  1.83  6.10
Well-drained terraces  Both  14.5  0.35  0.18
Poorly-drained terraces  Surface  17.5  8.07  3.57
Well-drained foothills  Both  24.1  11.67  1.33
a Cost measured as reduced profit.
b Reduced  farm profit divided by change  in nitrogen effluent.
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Input tax. Input taxes of 50% and  100% of the price of nitrogen fertilizer reduce nitrogen applications
on all farms.  However, overall abatement  is relatively  small, reflecting  the highly inelastic demand  for
nitrogen  for most  crops.  Differences  in  effectiveness  between  farms  reflect,  in part,  the differences  in
utilization rates of nitrogen between crops.
No-till directive. Use of conservation tillage (particularly no-till) has been credited with effective erosion
control with little effect on crop yield. However, no-till has been linked to higher levels of nitrate leaching
(Crosson and Brubaker). Simulations of the EPIC model for Willamette Valley conditions are consistent
with this finding. In fact, the three farms with groundwater  leachate problems actually produce solutions
with higher leachate  than the base. The directive  had no effect on solutions  for the two poorly-drained
farms, as use of no-till was already  most profitable.
Fallfertilizer  ban. A ban on fall applications of nitrogen actually increases overall leachate on the highly-
productive bottomland and well-drained terrace farms. On both farms, production moves away from fall
seeded crops  in favor of (higher polluting) vegetable  crops, where  such a ban would not be applicable.
Increased runoffalso is experienced on the poorly-drained bottomland farm, where annual ryegrass replaces
all perennial grasses, because annual grasses experience a smaller yield penalty. The only case in which a
ban is effective  is on the foothill  farm, where  all enterprises involve fall fertilization. By inducing shifts
from annual cultivation to perennial crops, considerable control of  leaching, erosion, and runoffis achieved.
Effectiveness  of Pollution Control Measures
In the  environmental  and  agricultural  situation  modeled  here,  effectiveness  of each  pollution control
instrument varies across farms. Important factors which influence this effectiveness  include the range of
production and cropping options and their relative profitability, as well as soil and topographic features.
Pollution taxes result in crop mixes similar or identical to the least-cost solutions on the better-drained
soils. While it is not possible to target a specific abatement level with taxes, they  are effective here with
respect to  nitrogen.  However,  taxes  on effluent are  relatively  ineffective  on more poorly-drained  soils;
instead, crop mixes remain similar to the unrestricted case, and the tax is merely absorbed.  In particular,
very high charge levels (e.g.,  $12/pound) may be necessary to achieve significant abatement when applied
on poorly-drained  soils.
Per acre  standards result in crop mixes very different from the least-cost crop mixes. The result is that
all  acres tend to be more  uniformly  polluting under standards,  rather than  a mix of higher  and lower
polluting rotations found in the optimal solution cases. Where a charge and standard  provide the same
level  of abatement,  the charge  (net of taxes)  will  provide abatement  at least  cost to society.  However,
such a policy places the bulk of the financial  cost of control on farmers.  In some cases,  standards and
charges result in the same crop mix, but the mix that results from imposed charges is always consistent
with the least-cost solution.
Direct controls  are of limited value in the Willamette  Valley. A "fall fertilizer ban"  results in a crop
mix comparable  to least-cost solutions only on the foothill farm. However,  a ban increases pollution on
the better-drained  soils,  as it induces  shifts  away from fall seeded crops  and towards (higher polluting)
vegetable production.  A requirement to use no-till on small grains and grass seeds also is not applicable
due to its tendencies to increase groundwater leaching of nitrates. No-till is effective at controlling erosion,
but that is not a significant problem in the Willamette Valley.
Nutrient effluent  from the representative  farms differs both in volume  and receiving  waters (surface
water, groundwater, or both). This indicates that a single policy, aimed at one type of  pollutant and targeted
on  all farms,  will not substantially  reduce  overall  effluent  and may actually exacerbate  other pollution
problems. Therefore, abatement policies should address pollutants by soil quality (e.g., drainage potential),
by farm type (such as vegetable farms for groundwater leachate),  or by geographic location.
Because  relatively  small changes in practices can achieve some abatement, and these changes occur at
least cost, they should be among the first strategies to be considered.  They would involve practices which
could be considered  "Best Management":  decreasing  nitrogen  applications  on at  least a portion of the
farm acreage,  moving tillage-intensive  crops  to lower  slopes,  or lengthening  vegetable crop rotations to
include small grains and winter cover  crops. On well-drained  farmlands (particularly  where many pro-
duction  options  exist),  effluent  charges  could  be  implemented  to  achieve  abatement  at  least  cost,  if
monitoring were feasible. Though specific abatement levels may be difficult to target,  charges still remain
more efficient  than per acre  standards.
A least-cost  method of achieving various  abatement levels  involves  farmers  shifting to the practices
and rotations indicated  by the least-cost  "efficiency  frontier"  for each farm  type.  While farmers  would
absorb the costs through  a loss in profit  (assuming there are  no  supply-induced  effects  on  crop prices),
voluntary adoption would cost society less than command-and-control measures which require additional
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implementation and monitoring costs. However, farmers would not be expected to change practices unless
they perceive greater welfare from maintaining autonomous choice than from an imposed command-and-
control measure,  although the outcome would be the same.
Conclusions
It is clear  that non-point  source  pollution policies  require  recognition of site-specific  characteristics  to
address the problem  effectively.  No single  policy is optimal  across all farm  types. Even  within a region
of similar climate, the effectiveness  of control policies in general and BMPs in particular can vary. Aside
from issues of implementation  costs and monitoring difficulty  associated with charges  and standards,  a
less complex approach  (such as permits)  may bear consideration.
These analyses,  for  a diversified agricultural  region under a high winter rainfall  regime,  also  suggest
that  some  nitrate  leachate  and  runoff reductions  can  be accomplished  with  little loss  in  profits.  This
conclusion  is applicable  to farms of differing  size, geographic  location,  slope, and  soil types.  Although
abatement is more expensive on poorly-drained soils, relatively minor changes in tillage management  or
nitrogen application  rates can reduce effluent.
Finally,  this study demonstrates the importance of modeling biophysical processes in the evaluation of
environmental policies, particularly those for non-point source pollution. While the data requirements of
biophysical  modeling  can be great, this integrated  approach provides a link between the biological and
physical  aspects  of the problem  and  producer  behavior  with  respect  to agricultural  production.  The
increasing  availability and  flexibility of biophysical simulators,  such as the one used here, will  enhance
the ability of economists to perform non-point pollution analyses.
[Received February 1991;final revision received December 1991.]
Notes
Eutrophication is a process involving nutrient enrichment of lakes and reservoirs,  the resultant growth of plant life,
and subsequent decline in dissolved oxygen.
2  Optimal  control methods are required to find the least-cost path in order to account for the interactive  effects  of
the pollutants.
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